Advice and Influence

Nothing to declare: Mandatory and voluntary disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest.

Abstract Professionals face conflicts of interest when they have a personal interest in giving biased advice. Mandatory disclosure—informing consumers of the conflict—is a widely adopted strategy in numerous professions, such as medicine, finance, and accounting. Prior research has shown, however, that such disclosures have little impact on consumer behavior, and can backfire by leading advisors […]

Nothing to declare: Mandatory and voluntary disclosure leads advisors to avoid conflicts of interest. Read More »

The burden of disclosure: Increased compliance with distrusted advice.

Abstract Professionals often face conflicts of interest that give them an incentive to provide biased advice, and disclosure (informing advisees about the conflict) is frequently proposed as a solution to the problem. We present 6 experiments that reveal a previously unrecognized perverse effect of disclosure: Although disclosure can decrease advisees’ trust in the advice, it

The burden of disclosure: Increased compliance with distrusted advice. Read More »

Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness.

Abstract Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors

Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness. Read More »